Stephen Biddle: Military Power (2004)

The "modern system" of battle and strategy is meant to prevent offenses from destroying too many of your troops and materiel, to make it difficult for them to advance, to make it hard for them to locate their concealed and covered and dispersed opponents. And if you are an offender, you want to penetrate the defense to cut off the defense's supportive troops and logistical support so starving them in place. And in any case suppress fire, or make it much less effective if there is enough dispersion of defenders or focus of offense.

So roughly argues Stephen  Biddle in Military Power (2004), through case studies, statistical analysis, and gaming simulation. It's detailed interesting argument, and there has been substantial criticism and support (for example, in about 2006 in the Journal of Strategic Studies). But in reading it, the argument is impressive, the care is impressive, and the scholarship is methodologically catholic.